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Abstract
Since independence in 1957, Malaysia has practiced consociational democracy 
that permits elite deliberation only. However, in the 2008 general election, 
Malaysian voters almost caused the Barisan Nasional government to be 
toppled by the opposition. They demanded more participation in policy 
making, as consociationalism has led to many malpractices in the government 
such as corruption and cronyism. The demands rose by the opposition, civil 
society, and new media have forced the government to implement an element 
of deliberative democracy. Although such deliberative democracy is probably 
a mask for the real agenda of continued authoritarian deliberation, strong 
pressures from the people are apt to ensure that deliberative democracy will be 
effectively practiced in the future.
Key words:  Malaysia, deliberative democracy, consociational democracy, 
civil society, Internet.
 
Malaysia is beginning to embrace the new politics of deliberative democracy, 
leaving behind the old politics of consociational democracy. Consociationalism 
and power sharing as practiced by the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) has permitted 
elite deliberation only. To stay in power, the BN-dominated government has 
restricted the people’s rights to political freedom and controlled dissents and 
criticism. However, since the twelfth general election on March 8, 2008, there 
has been a shift in Malaysia’s political arena toward deliberative democracy, 
caused by the BN’s dissension politics, a civil society movement, and the new 
Internet media. These three factors have managed to transform Malaysian 
society and open space for public participation and deliberation. In response to 
the new politics, Malaysia’s new prime minister, Najib Razak, introduced the 
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concept of “1Malaysia,” and has tailored his policies and decision-making to 
meet the demand for public deliberation. But many critics, especially those in 
the opposition, claim that many of his decisions, such as to take power from the 
Perak state government, prove that Najib’s program will fail. Whatever events 
occur, Malaysia already has entered into the politics of deliberative democracy, 
and respective parties are likely to perform according to the new politics.
The first section of this essay identifies the quintessential elements of 
consociational democracy practiced in post-colonial Malaysia. Deliberative 
politics typically existed only on the elite level, if at all. Next, this essay 
demonstrates the paradigmatic shift from consociational democracy to 
deliberative democracy on the public level in contemporary Malaysia. The 
essay then delves into the new leadership and new democratic practices, 
fleshing out a few distinct aspects of the processes of the new deliberative 
democracy. The final section concludes by suggesting that the transformation 
to deliberative democracy is probably a camouflage for the government’s real 
agenda to continue authoritarian deliberation and maintain authoritarianism, 
rather than to implement true public deliberation. However, with strong 
opposition parties, new media, and civil society, marked especially by the 
activism of the youth and the middle class, Malaysia is beginning to enter 
into a new politics of deliberative democracy, through which advocates aim to 
protect the common good as the main priority for the country.
Old Politics: Consociational Democracy for Elite Deliberation
Malaysia has practiced consociational democracy since it gained independence 
from British colonial rule in 1957. The success of Malaysia as a nation has 
depended on its political stability and racial harmony, which has encouraged 
the government to limit civil liberties such as freedom of speech and political 
rights. National unity, however, is an elusive concept. While racial and ethnic 
problems provide the breeding ground for regional politics and conflict 
among groups, the politics of alliances, or consociational politics, has been 
implemented to unite society. Arend Lijphart claimed that consociational 
democracy essentially is an agreement among the leaders of each bloc in a 
divided society to share government, involving “grand coalition, segmental 
autonomy, proportionality, and minority veto.”1 Consociationalists rely totally 
on civilized leadership to end the contest over sovereignty by agreeing to share 
power.
Tun Abdul Razak, former prime minister, has described Malaysian 
democracy as “a democracy which is suitable for a developing country with 
1 Arend Lijphart, “Varieties of Nonmajoritarian Democracy,” in Democracy and Institutions: The 
Life Work of Arend Lijphart, ed. Markus Crepaz, Thomas Koelble, and David Wilsford (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 228.
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different communities.”2 It is a democracy that takes into account “Malaysian 
realities,” or Malay-non-Malay animosities. Malaysia’s democratic practices 
must not jeopardize the fragile social stability, and political contestation is 
acceptable only as long as stability is preserved. A power-sharing arrangement 
has existed since Malayan independence. Although the Barisan Nasional (BN, 
National Front) coalition government is dominated by the United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO), and Malaysia’s executive authority lies 
mainly with the Malay leadership, other coalition partners, notably the non-
Malay parties Malaysian Chinese Associations (MCA) and Malaysian Indians 
Congress (MIC), participate in the Cabinet and enjoy a degree of influence over 
government policy. Indeed, political stability requires that Malays maintain 
political power in the country. The electoral system, the party system, the 
nature of political contestation, and even the constitution have been changed 
several times to ensure that Malays retain political power. For instance, the 
first major move by Tun Abdul Razak as director of the National Operations 
Council (NOC), the body established after racial tension in 1969, was to return 
to the constitutional contract to uphold and implement Malay political primacy 
more vigorously. In this way, he appeased the forces of Malay nationalism. At 
the same time, to pacify non-Malays, he recognized their rights to citizenship 
and their participation in the economy and the administration, but warned that 
“democratic excesses” had to be curbed. Non-Malays would no longer be 
allowed to challenge the constitutional contract. Malays would be entitled to 
full government assistance to achieve economic and social integration. There 
would be no more attempts at “pluralism” and “balancing acts of compromise 
and accommodation,” or as the Malay ultras had called it, “policies of give and 
take” to delay this course of action in the interests of social justice.3
Consociationalism, consensual decision-making, and respect for authority 
are important factors that maintain political stability and power sharing among 
races in Malaysia. It would appear that consensus-building is well-grounded 
in Malaysian society. The authority of a ruler is dependent upon just and fair 
treatment of his citizens in consultation with local elites. Thus, the building 
of consensus and respect for the masses remain essential elements in present 
Malaysian politics-the “Barisan (BN) way.”4 William Case wrote, “Even as 
UMNO proclaims before the Malay...its defense of their birthright, it tries to 
persuade the Chinese and Indians that it responsibly checks Malay chauvinism. 
The institutional basis for striking this balance-redressing Malay grievances 
2 Norma Mansor, “Political Contestation in Malaysia,” in Political Contestation: Case Studies 
from Asia, ed. Norma Mansor and Zakaria Ahmad (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1990), 30.
3 Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2002), 126-127.
4 Alan Collins, “The Ethnic Security Dilemma: Evidence from Malaysia,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 20, no. 3 (1998): 261-279.
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while at some level respecting non-Malay identities and property rights-is, of 
course the consultative Barisan way.”5 However, this consociational solution 
cannot be deliberative, save on the thinnest notion of what deliberation might 
entail, and places severe restrictions on who can deliberate (bloc leaders 
only).6
As Diane K. Mauzy noted, “Although Malaysia has many of the outward 
signs and some of the substance of democracy, to make the system of conflict 
regulation and elite accommodation viable there has also been substantial 
regulation of political competition and controls over popular participation, 
especially since 1969.”7 While this system of grand coalition is contrary to 
the strict principles of competition implied by democracy, the ruling elites see 
it differently. Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi claimed, “All have the 
right to speak, even if the issue involves matters related to specific races or 
specific religions. In the BN style, we are confident that we can discuss all 
issues, even if they involved sensitive topics, in a wise manner and come to a 
consensus. The key to this is that we must engage in discussion in an attitude 
of moderation.”8
Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak explained, “We remain as one nation 
not because of the need to meet the constitutional requirements, but because 
we are able to reach political consensus under the BN.”9 The BN has made 
decisions on the basis of mutual agreement, not majorities where the small 
parties have had the same rights and voice as the big parties in the BN. The 
traditional UMNO-led BN coalition has continued the understanding that each 
and every political party in this coalition will represent the interests of its racial 
group within the government. It is no mere coincidence that political parties of 
such varying complexions have found common ground in a philosophy based 
on the belief that the problems of Malaysian society never can be solved if 
sections of the polity are in perpetual conflict with one another. The BN also 
expresses a commitment to the politics of consultation and consensus, or the 
politics of good-will and cooperation.
The existence of many repressive laws such as the Internal Security Act 
(ISA), Sedition Act (SA), and Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) 
seems justifiable to the government as means to protect racial harmony. 
However, many have questioned the need to maintain these repressive laws. 
5 William Case, “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy,” in Political Legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 104.
6 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies, Working Paper No. 22, May 28 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 2003), http://socpol.anu.edu.au/pdf-files/Dryzek_
divided.pdf (accessed August 8, 2007), 15.
7 Diane K. Mauzy, Barisan Nasional (Kuala Lumpur: Marican and Sons, 1983), 4.
8 New Sunday Times, August 22, 2004, 1.
9 New Straits Times, February 14, 2008, 4.
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Members of the opposition parties and civil society criticize the repressive 
laws because they have been used to restrict the people’s rights to political 
freedom and freedom of speech. All mainstream media are directly controlled 
by either the government, such as Radio and Television Malaysia (RTM), or 
by companies that have a close link with the BN’s top leadership, such as 
Utusan Malaysia, New Straits Times, TV3, and NTV7. Their relationships 
with leadership make them favorable to the ruling BN. Many opposition 
party members and civil society activists who oppose the government turn to 
blogs and online news portals to channel their views and dissent against the 
government. This is good for democracy and public deliberation in Malaysia 
because the Internet provides debate on many issues concerning public interest, 
while the mainstream media limit such debate. This was obvious during the 
2008 general election, when the Internet provided the alternative views of 
the opposition after the mainstream media, dominated by the government, 
had lost its credibility owed to bias in their reporting. The shift of Malaysian 
democracy from the old politics of consociational democracy to the new 
politics of deliberative democracy seemingly is unavoidable.
New Politics:  The Shift to Public Deliberation through Deliberative 
Democracy
Consensus politics in Malaysia should be generated through the process 
of public deliberation, not elite deliberation as implemented by the BN 
government. Consensus through public deliberation is more holistic and reflects 
and serves the people’s interests in areas such as public policy and political 
culture. Public deliberation is the best way to protect the common good of 
society from manipulation, especially by the state. Deliberative democracy 
refers simply to “a conception of democratic government that secures a central 
place for reasoned discussion (rational deliberation) in political life.”10 James 
Bohman, another defender of deliberative democracy, posits that democracy 
in some form implies public deliberation; that is, “the deliberation of citizens 
is necessary if decisions are not to be merely imposed upon them...consent, is 
after all, the main feature of democracy.”11 In other words, political decision-
making is legitimate insofar as policies are produced in “a process of public 
discussion and debate in which citizens and their representatives, going beyond 
mere self-interest and limited points of view, reflect on the general interest or 
on their common good.”12
10 Maeve Cooke, “Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies 48, no. 5 
(2000): 947.
11 James Bohnam, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1996), 4.
12 Ibid.
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Among the numbers of definitions of deliberation and deliberative 
democracy, the Deliberative Democracy Consortium has one of the most 
practical versions: Deliberation is an approach to decision-making in which 
citizens consider relevant facts from multiple points of view, converse with 
one another to think critically about options before them and enlarge their 
perspectives, opinions and understandings. Deliberative democracy strengthens 
citizen voices in governance by including people of all races, classes, ages and 
geographies in deliberations that directly affect public decisions. As a result of 
citizens’ influence, they can see the result of their influence on the policy and 
resource decisions that impact their daily lives and their future.13
In the context of Malaysia, there are three factors that are determining 
the shift from consociational democracy to deliberative democracy: BN’s 
dissension politics, the civil society movement, and the new media. We will 
look, in turn, at each of these factors.
Barisan Nasional’s Dissension Politics
The BN party has faced challenges from smaller parties and even suffered 
defeat in five states (Kelantan, Kedah, Perak, Penang, and Selangor) in the 2008 
general election, as well as in by-elections held in Permatang Pauh on August 
26, 2008, Kuala Terengganu on January 17, 2009, Bukit Gantang and Bukit 
Selambau on April 7, 2009, Manek Urai on July 14, 2009, and Permatang Pasir 
on August 25, 2009. The ruling BN managed to retain only two seats through 
by-elections in Batang Ai on April 7, 2009, and Bagan Pinang on October 11, 
2009, but it did not contest in the Penanti by-election on May 31, 2009. In 
Peninsular Malaysia, the BN failed to obtain a majority of the popular votes 
cast. In the general election, it obtained only 49 percent of the popular votes, 
whereas the opposition won the majority-51 percent. UMNO won 35 percent 
of the popular votes against 34.8 percent won by the Parti Islam SeMalaysia 
(PAS, Islamic Party) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People Justice Party). 
Although the BN won 140 seats in Parliament, fifty-four seats came from 
Sabah and Sarawak. Hence, without Sabah and Sarawak, BN would not have 
obtained even a simple majority in Parliament. If the Federal Territory were 
considered a state, the BN actually lost six states.14 Among BN component 
parties, MCA won only 37.5 percent (fifteen) of the contested Parliament seats. 
Gerakan was totally wiped out in Penang-its stronghold. The Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) campaigned that a vote for MCA or Gerakan was a vote 
for UMNO, to capitalize on the anger of the Chinese community over UMNO. 
13 Deliberative Democracy Consortium, Deliberative Democracy (MD: Research and Practitioner 
Conference, 2003), 3.
14 ASLI (Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute), An Analysis of Malaysia’s 12th General Election 
(Kuala Lumpur: ASLI, 2008), 1-2, http://www.as;i.com.my/DOCUMENT/An%20Analysis%2
0of%20Malaysia.pdf (accessed March 3, 2009).
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Thus, the track records of MCA and Gerakan were ignored, with an emotional 
swing against UMNO.15 The opposition PAS, PKR, and DAP (with eighty-
two parliamentary seats) formed a loose coalition called Pakatan Rakyat (PR, 
People Alliance) soon after the general election.
According to Bridget Welsh, the reasons for the BN setback in the twelfth 
general election had more to do with the coalition’s lackluster performance 
under Abdullah than the strength of the opposition.16 She argues that, in his four 
years in office, Abdullah had managed to maintain economic growth but was 
ineffective in channeling the benefits to ordinary citizens. Ordinary Malaysians 
were squeezed, as economic gains were seen to be disproportionately directed 
toward the increasingly arrogant political elite, notably leaders of UMNO.17 
Malaysians began to feel insecure and anxious about the price spiral of fuel 
and essential goods.18 These bread-and-butter issues influenced the voters to 
sway toward the opposition in the election. Furthermore, comparatively lower 
wages, an increased lack of confidence in Abdullah’s administration, and 
persistent corruption translated into massive disgruntlement among Malaysians 
of all races.
The declining economic situation was compounded by a shocking record 
of managing ethnic relations, particularly the concerns of non-Malays.19 
Chinese, Indian, and East Malaysian voices were ignored and often insultingly 
dismissed, as rising Malay chauvinism went unchecked within Abdullah’s 
party.20 For instance, in successive speeches by delegates at the 2006 UMNO 
general assembly, race and religion were featured prominently in shrill tones, 
stirring unease among locals and foreigners. Hasnoor Hussein, a delegate from 
Malacca, said in his fifteen-minute address to UMNO members, “UMNO is 
15 Ibid., 2.
16 Bridget Welsh, “Malaysia’s Democratic Opening,” Open Democracy, March 11, 2008, 1-
3. http:// www .opendemocracy.net/article/democracy_power/politics_protest/malaysia_
democratic_opening (accessed March 15, 2008).
17 Ibid.
18 For instance, since taking over as prime minister, Abdullah had increased the price of petrol five 
times from RM1.35 per liter in 2003 to RM2.70 per liter in 2008, exactly a 100 percent increase 
in just less than five years. See Harakah, “Kempen: Kerajaan angkuh bila harga minyak naik” 
[Campaign: The government is arrogant during oil price hike] February 4, 2008, 2. In fact, 
inflation was at 7.7 percent, a record in twenty-six years, and transport prices rose 19.6 percent in 
June 2008 as compared with the year before. Food and nonalcoholic beverages rose 10 percent, 
and, in first half of 2008, consumer prices rose 3.7 percent from the same period the year before. 
All these happened after the fuel price hike in June 2008 in order for the government to cut the 
country’s subsidies bill, which would have reached RM50 billion in 2008. See AFP (Agence 
France-Presse), “Malaysian Inflation Hits 26-Year High,” July 23, 2008, http://news.my.msn.
com/regional/article.aspx?cp-documentid=1583941 (accessed August 15, 2008).
19 Ibid.
20 Leslie Lopez, “Race Rhetoric Is Part of Umno Politics,” Straits Times, November 17, 2006, 1, 
http://malaysia-today.net/blog2006/newsncom.php?itemid=792 (accessed August 15, 2008).
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willing to risk lives and bathe in blood to defend the race and religion. Don’t 
play with fire. If they messed with our rights, we will mess with theirs.”21 
In fact, Abdullah harnessed racial identity to buttress his position within the 
party, rejuvenating the racially based affirmative action policy of the “New 
Economic Policy” (NEP), and lost the confidence of the non-Malay community 
in his handling of the sensitive expansion of Islamic governance through the 
concept of Islam Hadhari (Civilization Islam). Lack of confidence was clear 
in the twelfth general election when the Chinese and Indian votes decisively 
swung to the DAP and PKR, causing MCA, MIC, and Gerakan to lose massive 
support.22
On the other hand, former finance minister, Daim Zainuddin, in an 
interview with the magazine Dewan Masyarakat, maintained that the twelfth 
general election had been held at the wrong time because the government still 
had not resolved many sensitive issues, such as the HINDRAF riot case,23 
BERSIH demands and rallies,24 and the V.K. Lingam tape.25 According to 
Daim, it would have been better if the government had resolved these cases 
before dissolving the Parliament and facing the election.26
21 Ibid.
22 ASLI (Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute), An Analysis of Malaysia’s 12th General 
Election, 2.
23 A coalition of thirty Hindu NGOs, committed to the preservation of Hindu community rights 
and heritage, had organized a rally of ten thousand people turned into a riot on November 25, 
2007, as it submitted the petition at the British High Commission. The group had led agitations 
against what they saw as an “unofficial policy of temple demolition” and concerns about the 
steady encroachment of shariah-based law. See Andreas Ufen, “The 2008 Elections in Malaysia: 
Uncertainties of Electoral Authoritarianism,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 4, no. 1 (2008): 
162-163, and The Star Online, “Cops Forced to Use Tear Gas, Water Cannons,” November 
26, 2007, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/11/26/nation/19575394&sec=nation 
(accessed August 15, 2008).
24 The 2007 BERSIH (the Joint Action Committee for Electoral Reform) Rally held in Kuala 
Lumpur on November 10, 2007, where forty thousand people defied the ban by attending the 
rally. In a separate BERSIH’s information rally, two people suffered bullet wounds from police 
actions in September in Batu Burok, Terengganu. See BERSIH, 2007, http://www.bersih.org 
(accessed January 1, 2008).
25 The grainy eight-minute video footage was taken in 2002 at senior lawyer Vellupillai Kana 
[V.K.] Lingam’s Kelana Jaya house. At that time, Mohamed Dzaiddin Abdullah was Chief 
Justice (CJ). The conversation revolved around the urgent need to get Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh 
Abdul Halim, then chief judge of Malaya-the judiciary’s No. 3-appointed as Court of Appeal 
president (No. 2) and then CJ (No. 1). There was also a plan to get former attorney-general 
Mokhtar Abdullah, who was then a Federal Court judge, to replace Ahmad Fairuz as No 3. To 
do that, Lingam had roped in tycoon Vincent Tan, a close crony of then Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad, and Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor, a key minister in the PM’s department. They 
were to talk to Mahathir on the appointment of judges. See Malaysiakini, “Special Report: The 
Lingam Tape,” September 24, 2007, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/72772 (accessed May 
30, 2008).
26 Dewan Masyarakat, “Daim Zainuddin: BN mesti mendengar semula rintihan rakyat” [Daim 
Zainuddin: BN must listen to people’s grievances], May 2008, 22.
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Greed and the quest for power among its members seemed to have been 
key reasons for the 5 percent swing in Malay votes away from the BN. Critics 
such as Zainon Ahmad, political editor of the English-daily The Sun, argues, 
“It is no longer the party [BN] struggle for bangsa, agama dan tanahair 
(nation, religion, and country), the party slogan of the early years. That has 
taken a back seat. It’s the narrow individual struggle to amass wealth....For 
UMNO, volunteerism is long gone.”27 Another critic, Shukri Shuib, a lecturer 
at University Utara Malaysia, agrees with Zainon by arguing, “UMMO leaders 
were engrossed with tenders, wealth and corruption issues, cronyism and weak 
leadership, outdated ideas and implementation of projects that did not have 
a positive impact on people....They must now think of their responsibility to 
the race above self, family and friends.”28 It seems that Malay voters also no 
longer viewed UMNO as the sole champion representing them, which was 
reflected at the polls.
Due to the loss in the elections, BN component parties such as the MCA, 
Gerakan, MIC, and People Progressive Party (PPP) blamed each other, and 
began to criticize UMNO for being over conservative and resisting changes 
from within in order to present itself as a true multiracial coalition. However, 
ever since the general election, UMNO still has harped on its old concept of 
upholding Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) over other ethnicities, thus 
fending off any efforts by several quarters within the coalition to initiate 
changes and rebranding in order to move the BN toward a nonracial approach 
to its policies. A call by MCA for UMNO to do away with the Ketuanan Melayu 
elicited an immediate response from the UMNO youth chief, Hishamuddin 
Hussein, that the call questioned Malay rights. Gerakan later joined the fray by 
supporting MCA’s call to end the supremacist policies of UMNO.29
The penumpang (squatters) issue, referring to the Malaysian Chinese, 
raised by the Bukit Bendera UMNO division chief, Ahmad Ismail, stirred 
up immense waves of resentment in the Chinese community which have not 
been tamed in the least, even with the apology offered by then Deputy Prime 
Minister Najib Razak. Both the MCA and the Gerakan believe that there are 
deficiencies in the manner with which this issue has been handled by the 
BN’s top brass, resulting in heightened emotions that may culminate in the 
eventual withdrawal of these two parties from the ruling coalition. Gerakan 
president Koh Tsu Koon has said that his party has not ruled out the possibility 
of pulling out from BN. While the MCA leadership has stressed that it will 
27 “Umno Comes under Fire from Malays: Malaysian Dailies Say Malay Voters Turned off by 
Politicians’ Greed for Power,” Straits Times, March 15, 2008, http://www.straitstimes.com/
Free/Story/STIStory_216887.html (accessed May 30, 2008).
28 Ibid.
29 Viktor Wong, “Blog: BN Heading for a Break Up?” Star Online, December 2, 2008, 1, http://
blog.thestar.com.my.permalink.asp?id=19763 (accessed April 15, 2009).
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not pull out from BN, party president Ong Ka Ting made it very clear that he 
could not accept the Deputy Prime Minister’s explanation. Ong’s tough stance 
has been rare among the MCA’s presidents, past and present. What Koh and 
Ong have said to a large extent represents the unwavering stand of the Chinese 
community, that the manner in which Prime Minister Abdullah handled this 
issue was unacceptable to the Chinese community. Talks of MCA and Gerakan 
pulling out of BN, as well as the strongly worded messages delivered by the 
Chinese community, must be treated with due respect by various component 
parties of BN.30
Furthermore, the PPP called for the ISA to be reviewed and amended, and 
stated that it would leave BN if changes were not implemented. The MCA, too, 
later supported the PPP’s move by calling for the repeal of the ISA. The MIC 
intended to pull out from the Cabinet formed by Abdullah’s successor, Najib 
Razak, in April 2009, after the disappointment that there was no allocation 
of a senior ministerial portfolio or addition of a deputy minister post to the 
MIC. However, a component party in Sabah, the SAPP,31 already had left BN 
and was considering joining the opposition PR to end UMNO’s dominancy 
in Sabah, while a large number of Dayak political and community leaders in 
Sarawak also had made their move by joining the PKR en bloc, causing BN to 
be on alert regarding the recent mass defections.
As long as the UMNO leadership insists on maintaining its current trends 
and resists any drastic changes, policies in the BN and the government will 
remain as they were fifty years ago, which could spell the end of the MCA, the 
Gerakan, the MIC, and the PPP. These BN component parties continue to believe 
that for any real change to happen, it must be driven by UMNO. Consensus 
politics is not as it used to be. Many decisions made by UMNO leaders were 
without consultation with other BN component parties, for instance, in the 
matter of claiming that Malaysia is an “Islamic state.” The first prime minister, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Alhaj, once admitted that Malaya/Malaysia was 
a secular state. However, the status changed during the period of Mahathir 
Mohamad’s leadership. Mahathir unilaterally, probably with the intention to 
counter PAS’s concept of an “Islamic state,” announced that Malaysia was 
an Islamic state. This declaration led to controversy within the non-Malay 
community, whose members rejected such a notion in Malaysia. Abdullah later 
declared that Malaysia is an Islamic state, but not a secular or theocratic state. 
He argued that Malaysia would be ruled by following Islamic principles and 
30 “MCA and Gerakan at a Crossroad,” My Sinchew, September 10, 2008, 1, http://www.
mysinchew. com/ node /16065 (accessed April 15, 2009). 
31 On June 18, 2008, Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP), one of the BN component parties, announced 
its intention to issue a vote of no-confidence in the Parliament against Prime Minister Abdullah 
if he failed to step down. SAPP later announced its withdrawal from BN and two of its members 
of Parliament became independent. This is an indication of the tight rope Abdullah has been 
walking in keeping the BN component parties together in the post-election period.
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democratic parliamentary principles as stated in the Federal Constitution.32 
The Islamic state dispute shows that any policy not created through consensus 
decision-making will become controversial, because people are dissatisfied 
with the government for not considering or even listening to their views in the 
process of policy-making. Only through the process of deliberative democracy 
or public deliberation can true consensus politics be achieved and the common 
good of the people identified, so that, if not all, at least a majority of Malaysians 
of different races can accept the policy.
The Civil Society
Civil society in Malaysia has become a legitimate channel for social and political 
participation and for influencing policy formation and public opinion. Signs of 
change started to appear during the Reformasi period following the arrest of 
Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. The contribution that Malaysia’s nascent civil society 
made to the anti-authoritarian struggles in the 1990s is widely recognized today. 
In the 2008 general election, a political analyst, James Wong, said, “There is 
the traditional opposition which has been now joined by civil society, students, 
independent journalists and non-government organizations [NGOs].”33 Several 
activists have contested under the banner of the DAP, among them, Charles 
Santiago, the coordinator of the Coalition against Privatization, who has fought 
to prevent privatization of water and to stop big business from raising the 
prices of a natural resource. Others such as Tian Chua and Sivarasa Rasiah of 
PKR used to be involved with an NGO, Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM). 
Human rights leaders saw NGO participation in the 2008 general election as 
“pivotal,” adding a new dimension to participatory politics. Yap Swee Seng, 
executive director of SUARAM, stated, “The general election is the time 
for NGOs to push the civil society agenda and make their voice heard....The 
ultimate objective is to ensure a strong, multi-party opposition that can better 
safeguard the constitution and people’s interest.”34 Many former NGO activists 
won in the 2008 general election, such as Tian Chua and Sivarasa Rasiah, who 
gained parliamentary seats, and Elizabeth Wong, former Malaysian Human 
Rights Association (HAKAM) activist, who won a state assembly seat for the 
PKR and has been appointed as Executive Councilor (Exco) in Selangor’s PR 
state government. This shows that Malaysia’s civil society movement is now 
entering into the real politics of a struggle for power. Perhaps this is the best 
way to serve the people and fight for what they believe in.
The problem with civil society in Malaysia is that little or no attention 
32 Lee Ban Chen, Bagaimana Keris diganti dengan Merpati? [How was the dagger replaced by the 
dove?] (Kuala Lumpur: Oriengroup, 2008), 48.
33 Baradan Kuppusamy, “Politics-Malaysia: Civil Society Leaders Enter Election Fray,” Inter Press 
Service News (IPS News), February 13, 2008, 1, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41175 
(accessed June 3, 2008).
34 Ibid., 2.
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has been paid to its organizations, although their views are critical to the state. 
More often than not the views and arguments of critically minded NGOs have 
been dismissed by the state on the grounds that they are antidevelopmental 
and sponsored by foreign agencies for the pursuance of ulterior motives.35 The 
government controls the mainstream media, thus the space in the public sphere 
is very limited for the NGOs, except in the cyberspace of the Internet. The 
government belittles criticisms from the NGOs by portraying them as marginal 
and out of touch with the mass public. However, civil society has proven that 
its autonomous associations have become a new force to be reckoned with.
Since the end of the general election in 2008, Malaysia’s civil society 
movement has become stronger due to a change in the hearts and minds of the 
two major components of the society, the youth and the middle class. First, 
Malaysia’s young voters between the ages of twenty-one to forty appear to 
be becoming impatient with what they perceive as the BN’s reluctance and 
resistance to change. In the August 26, 2008 Permatang Pauh by-election, more 
than 90 percent of the voters under the age of thirty voted for Anwar Ibrahim.36 
One key reason for this was that young Internet-savvy voters obtain their news 
chiefly from pro-opposition alternative media, which they perceive as more 
credible than mainstream media. In the Kuala Terengganu by-election, which 
BN lost, detailed voting data indicated that the ruling coalition again had lost 
most support among those under thirty-five.37 This also happened in two other 
by-elections in Bukit Gantang and Bukit Selambau. Political apathy among 
youth is long gone. Young voters are aware of what is happening around them 
and have varied reasons to vote for the opposition. BN’s disconnect from young 
people is most alarming in the case of urban professionals, who no longer 
believe that the ruling coalition is capable of making a better Malaysia. Young 
non-Malays cannot accept the NEP, believing that it benefits only the Malays, 
while young educated Malays concerned with good governance, human 
rights, and democratic ideals view UMNO and BN as corrupt.38 According to 
Zubaidah Abu Bakar, young voters tend to favor members of the opposition 
because they have more liberal views of democracy, and less preference for 
race-based politics, which explains the appeal of the multiracial PKR.39 Young 
people also do not feel indebted to the government that achieved independence 
for Malaysia half a century ago. BN leaders should realize by now that 
campaigning on the basis of track records, especially after Kuala Terengganu, 
35 Palanisamy Ramasamy [P. Ramasamy], “Civil Society in Malaysia: An Arena of Contestations?” 
in Civil Society in Southeast Asia, ed. Lee Hock Guan (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), 209.
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no longer works with young voters. Prospects for the next general election will 
be bleak for the BN if it fails to win the support of the youth. Eligible youthful 
voters in the country will number 16.9 million in the thirteenth general election, 
including the 10.9 million currently registered. The support of young voters is 
now the determinant in the outcome of future Malaysian politics, and needs to 
be targeted by all political parties.
Second, closely linked to the youth factor, the 2008 elections also marked 
the gradual coming of age of the new Malaysian middle class.40 Powered 
previously by significant economic growth, a new generation of educated 
white-collar Malaysians was born and finally has been able to flex its political 
strength. Until the opposition parties put together their new moderate working 
alliance, the choices for this middle class were stark: to vote for an avowedly 
Islamic Malay-based party, or for an avowedly secular Chinese-based one. For 
many, there was no alternative but BN. Members of the middle class have 
grown up ripe for change, and cynical about the country’s illusion of harmony 
and equality. They are also educated and skilled, and are thus unafraid to take 
the chance on the opposition. The largely urban minority communities have 
long felt marginalized by the government’s long-running affirmative action 
program. The system guarantees ethnic Malays jobs, free education, cheap 
housing, tax breaks, and economic favors, all at the expense of ethnic Chinese, 
Indian, and indigenous people who make up 40 percent of the population. The 
system was designed to help the Malays catch up with the rest of the country 
after independence from Britain, but it has turned into a state-sponsored 
web of cronyism and favoritism for a few selected Malays under the UMNO 
patronage system, paralyzing the country along a racial divide. It also has 
built a deep resentment among the ethnic minorities, who are left to fend for 
themselves.41 According to Francis Loh, “We have a new set of voters-middle 
class, educated, and who are very exposed to global developments, and the use 
of new technology. Partly because of this new generation of people, they are 
demanding more than development.”42 Loh also stated,
40 The category “middle class” focuses on the new educated middle class in both the public 
and private sectors, which includes professionals (including teachers, managers, lawyers, 
accountants, technicians), administrators/civil servants, and students and intellectuals. See 
Mark R. Thompson, Reform after Reformasi: Middle Class Movements for Good Governance 
after Democratic Revolution in Southeast Asia, Working Paper No. 21 (Lund: Lund University, 
Center for East and Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 3.
41 Natasha Rudha, “Door Opens for Opposition and Hope in Malaysia,” Canberra Times, 
November 3, 2008, 1, http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/opinion/editorial/general/door-
opens-for-opposition-and-hope-in-malaysia /135631.aspx (accessed April 20, 2009).
42 Sivamurugan Pandian, “The Middle Class and Signification of 2008 Malaysia General 
Elections,” paper presented at The First ISA Forum of Sociology, September 5-8 (Barcelona: 
International Sociological Association, 2008), 9.
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If you compare Malaysia with neighboring countries, the 
government, in a sense has done better than others but this 
generation demands more than development. And even 
with development, they want a development that is more 
sustainable and equitable. And they are also asking, ‘What 
about our democratic rights?’ They want more political 
participation, more consultation.43
Many in the middle class wish to see whether, in the running of government, 
integrity, transparency, and democratic rights can be maintained. It is clear 
that members of the middle class have developed interest group activities and 
have lobbied governments on particular issues, such as the Gerakan Mansuh 
ISA (GMI) against the draconian law of ISA and the BERSIH on free and fair 
elections. They also have mounted a serious and direct political challenge to 
the regime.
However, scholars such as Jurgen Habermas have argued that, in order for 
civil society to function well, it needs to be assisted by the media.44 The problem 
is that Malaysia does not have a free media. However, the current revolution 
in the media industry through the introduction of Internet and other technology 
has created a new public sphere for public deliberation. This new media has 
strengthened civil society movements and has been used to transform public 
opinion, as happened in Malaysia during the 2008 general election.
The New Media
The Internet definitely is a medium that can be used to challenge a regime that 
does not honor democratic practices and to weaken the traditional print and 
broadcast media that are controlled by the regime or companies with close ties 
to it. The Internet, especially through blogs and Internet news portals, has given 
civil society and Malaysian people a new hope to be able to access informed, 
critical views that challenge the government, as mainstream media forbid or 
limit criticism. The true impact of these new media is found in the reports and 
coverage on the Internet that were strong enough to influence people to vote for 
the opposition PR in the 2008 general election. In fact, the ruling government 
admitted that one of the major factors in determining the 2008 general election 
results was the new media of the Internet.45 On March 25, 2008, at the opening 
of Invest Malaysia 2008, Abdullah acknowledged that the BN government 
43 Ibid.
44 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 1996).
45 Koh Lay Chin, “Was This the Election Made on the Internet?” New Straits Times, March 12, 
2008, 25.
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lost the online war in the general election. He said, “We didn’t think it was 
important. It was a serious misjudgment. We thought that the newspapers, the 
print media, the television were important but young people were looking at 
text messages and blogs. [The influence of alternative media] was painful. But 
it came at the right time, not too late.”46
The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) 
is the regulator for the converging communications and multimedia industry, 
including the Internet. At the time it was created, its key role was the regulation 
of the communications and multimedia industry based on the powers provided 
in the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission Act and the 
Communications and Multimedia Act, both of which were enacted in 1998. 
Pursuant to the acts, the role of the MCMC is to implement and promote the 
government’s national policy objectives for the communications and multimedia 
sector and also to oversee the new regulatory framework for the converging 
industries of telecommunications, broadcasting, and on-line activities. Its roles 
in social regulation include content development and regulation. The latter 
includes the prohibition of offensive content as well as public education on 
content-related issues.47 Section 211 of the Communications and Multimedia 
Act stipulates that, “No content applications service provider, or other person 
using a content applications service, shall provide content which is indecent, 
obscene, false, menacing, or offensive in character with intent to annoy, 
abuse, threaten or harass any person.”48 Consensus is necessary at both the 
rule-generating and enforcement stages of such legislation.49 However, most 
people believe that one of the reasons the Internet has worked so well and is 
a vital force in providing information to the public is that it has been free of 
government regulation.50 The rules and regulations are believed to have been 
crafted to reduce the passion for Internet use, but ironically, the use of Web sites 
has flourished and contributed to the public’s deliberation process. In 1996, 
when former Prime Minister Mahathir launched the ambitious Multimedia 
Super Corridor (MSC) project to attract the world’s leading Information 
Technology companies to Malaysia, the government developed the MSC Bill 
of Guarantees, which included a commitment that the Malaysian government 
never would censor the Internet. This policy continues today, permitting 
political opposition and civil society movements to benefit by means of the 
46 “Internet Served a Painful Lesson,” New Straits Times, March 26, 2008, 2.
47 Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, 2004, http://www.mcmc.gov.my/
mcmc/facts_figures/stats/index.asp (accessed June 24, 2004).
48 Communications and Multimedia Act, 1998, http://www.mcmc.gov.my/mcmc/what_we_do/
socreg.asp (accessed February 28, 2008).
49 Stuart Biegel, Beyond Our Control? Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of 
Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 53.
50 Ibid., 355.
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new public sphere of the Internet, despite mainstream broadcasting and printed 
media’s hostility to them.51
A new online civil society has emerged among bloggers, who offer 
alternative views to the country. However, the Malaysian government has 
curbed the Internet, not through cyber censorship, but through prosecuting 
Web operators under existing media and libel laws. The government has 
initiated several efforts to curb the bloggers’ activities, and has extensively 
criticized them for spreading lies, while threatening severe punishment and 
tighter controls on Internet use. In January 2007, the government-linked New 
Straits Times Press (NSTP) filed suits against Ahirudin Attan and Jeff Ooi 
over items published on their Web sites a year before, which criticized the 
newspaper for low journalistic standards. This was the first time bloggers had 
been taken to court for publishing comments on the Internet. On September 12, 
2008, the government detained a blogger, Raja Petra Kamaruddin, under the 
Internal Security Act. He was arrested under ISA Section 73(1) for allegedly 
being a threat to security, peace, and public order.52
Reporters Without Borders (RWB) published a report entitled Press 
Freedom Index 2007.53 Among 169 countries surveyed, Malaysia strikingly 
dropped 32 notches from 92nd place in 2006 to 124th in 2007. RWB is 
concerned about the increase in cases of online censorship in Malaysia, for 
example, the arrests of bloggers and the closure of news Web sites or the 
government’s rendering them inaccessible. RWB observed, “More and more 
governments [including the Malaysian government] have realized that the 
Internet can play a key role in the fight for democracy and they are establishing 
new methods of censoring it. The governments of repressive countries are 
now targeting bloggers and online journalists as forcefully as journalists in 
the traditional media.”54 It is Malaysia’s worst ranking since the annual Press 
Freedom Index was initiated in 2002.
Malaysia’s weak opposition groups were up against a hostile mainstream 
media and restrictive campaign rules in 2008, but they went online and turned 
effectively to blogs, news portals, and YouTube to dodge a virtual blackout 
by mainstream media.55 The worldwide Web allowed parties such as the 
51 Cherian George, Contentious Journalism and the Internet: Towards Democratic Discourse in 
Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), 60-70.
52 Raja Petra was detained after he was said to have posted articles on Malaysia Today, deemed 
to be seditious and that also were belittling of Islam. The Department of Islamic Development 
(JAKIM) and several Muslim bodies had lodged a police report against Raja Petra, who already 
faced criminal defamation charges for allegedly insulting the Malays, Muslims, and Islam. On 
November 7, 2008, the High Court ruled Raja Petra’s detention was unconstitutional and the 
judge ordered his release from ISA detention. See “22 Websites, Blogs Probed,” The Star, May 
27, 2008, 1-8.
53 Reporters Without Borders For Press Freedom (RWB), Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2007, 
2008, http:// www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24025 (accessed February 21, 2008).
54 Ibid.
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DAP, PKR, and PAS to reach voters, especially young ones, in their offices 
and homes. As of December 2006, most of Malaysia’s 10.3 million registered 
voters were between twenty-one and thirty-five years of age. These data, 
compiled by the Election Commission and published in The Sun on February 
28, 2008, indicate that these youthful voters will be the group that determines 
the results of future general elections, and that political parties must target 
this group to win.56 It is clear that in the 2008 election, the opposition parties 
targeted and won the hearts and minds of youthful voters. Besides, many young 
voters were keen and interested to support the young candidates representing 
the opposition parties. For instance, the support of young voters enabled young 
and first-time candidates such as the DAP’s Hannah Yeoh and the PKR’s Loh 
Gwo-Burne to draw record crowds of more than ten thousand to their hastily 
organized ceramah (public gathering) in USJ, Selangor, in the first week of 
campaigning. Later, Yeoh won the Subang Jaya state seat, and Loh, who had 
also filmed the infamous V.K. Lingam clip that triggered a judiciary crisis, won 
the Kelana Jaya parliamentary seat. Compared with the opposition’s regularly 
updated Web-logs, BN component parties had virtually no Web presence, 
except for Malaysia’s mainstream media via their online newspapers. Google 
searches on the DAP, PKR, and PAS far outstripped those on BN, UMNO, 
and other component parties. Google searches on PAS and PKR in Malay far 
outnumbered those in English, and were highest in small cities and towns such 
as Kuantan in Pahang and Kajang in Selangor.57
Opposition leaders such as Lim Kit Siang runs three blogs (http://www.
limkitsiang.com; http://blog.limkitsiang.com; and http://limkitsiang.blogspot.
com) which are meticulously updated with multiple posts every day, and many 
of the party’s other leaders follow suit. Lim argued that blogging was one way 
to get the word out and offered an opportunity to circumvent media control, 
with the aim to dent the government’s traditional majority number of votes in 
the 2008 election. He said, “We cannot neutralize the state-controlled media....
But Internet pick-up rates will keep getting higher. We will not be blacked 
out forever.”58 Political dissident and ex-deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim writes 
55 Sarah Stewart, “Malaysia’s Opposition Turns to Cyberspace Election Campaigning,” AFP-
Media Watch, February 28, 2008, http://mediawatch.afp.com/?post/2008/02/28/ Malaysias-
opposition-turns-to-cyberspace-election-campaining (accessed May 30, 2008), and Bill Tarrant, 
“Malaysia Opposition Win Shows Power of Cyberspace,” Reuters, March 9, 2008, http://
ca.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idCAKLR6139420080309 (accessed May 30, 2008).
56 Bryan D. See, “Malaysia Elections 2008: Young Voters, Where Art Thou?” NowPublic: Crowd 
Powered Media, February 29, 2008, http://www.nowpublic.com/world/malaysia-elections-
2008-young-voters-where-art-thou (accessed May 30, 2008).
57 Lee Siew Lian, “Cyberspace Is Now the New Frontline,” New Straits Times, March 12, 2008, 
25.
58 “Malaysia’s Opposition Mounts Campaign in Cyberspace,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), 
February 20, 2008, http://news.my.msn.com/regional/article.aspx?cp-documentid=1253093 
(accessed March 17, 2008).
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his own blogs (http://www.anwaribrahim.com and http://anwaribrahimblog.
com) which have news links and videos of his PKR’s campaign activities. In 
2007, Anwar used the sites to release a video clip which showed a high-profile 
lawyer, V.K. Lingam.
Bloggers turned opposition candidates also used the Internet to solicit funds 
for their election campaigns. For example, DAP’s Tony Pua, in his campaign 
for the Petaling Jaya Utara parliamentary seat, argued that e-donations were a 
new way for the party to raise funds. He noted, “Previously, we obtained funds 
through conventional means such as ceramah and dinners....The Internet is 
now another important channel which has helped us tremendously to get more 
funds.”59 Through the Web site, Pua managed to collect more than RM10,000 
via credit card and online transfers, while another RM20,000 were sent to 
the Maybank2U account. The target was to raise 50 percent of the amount 
that election candidates are legally permitted to spend. The law stipulates 
that parliamentary and state candidates may spend up to RM200,000 and 
RM100,000, respectively. Pua added that conventional fund-raising methods 
were still yielding better results. He managed to collect some RM45,000 over 
five nights from ceramah.60
The impact of bloggers is clearly shown in the volume of people accessing 
their sites. For example, during the 2008 election, a prominent political blog, 
Malaysia Today (http://www.malaysia-today.net), had some 15 million hits the 
day after results were announced, a more than threefold increase from a normal 
day. The number of hits worked out to about 625,000 visitors an hour. The 
site’s owner, Raja Petra Kamarudin, said, “Traffic went up so high that I could 
not get on to update the site.”61 The massive number of visitor posted on the 
Web site gave one of the clearest indications of just how much the Malaysian 
public had turned to alternative media for its political news. With opposition 
parties feeling shut out by traditional news media, they turned to the Internet to 
air their views, and it seems many Malaysians follow them there.
During Malaysia’s 2008 general election, one online news portal, the 
Malaysiakini (http://www.malaysiakini.com), was so dominant that one 
can regard it as a determining factor in the people’s decision to vote for the 
opposition. Malaysiakini was so overwhelmed by visitors on polling day 
that the site broke down. According to the company’s chief executive officer, 
Premesh Chandran, at its peak, the site had some 500,000 visitors an hour, a 
sharp jump from between the 100,000 and 200,000 hits it customarily had a 
day.62 In comparison, the New Straits Times Web site received only 970,000 
59 Eileen Ng, “Opposition Using Internet to Raise Funds,” New Straits Times, March 3, 2008, 17.
60 Ibid.
61 Jeremy Au Yong, “Battle Lost in Cyberspace,” Straits Times, March 12, 2008, 1, http://www. 
straitstimes .com /Free/Story/STIStory_215784.html (accessed May 30, 2008).
62 Ibid.
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visits for one day, from midnight on election day to midnight the following 
day.63 Chandran said that the alternative media had broken the monopoly of the 
government on the media and provided a platform for information distribution 
for people not in power. Chandran contended that no one was caught more off-
guard than the government. As he put it,
They [members of the government] thought it wouldn’t reach 
beyond the segment of the community that had Internet access. 
They didn’t consider the spill over effect. If you had gone to 
a rally, you would have seen that the people are well aware 
of the issues, issues that were only broadcast on alternative 
media. The Internet fed the information into a certain part of 
the community, and it spread from there.64
He referred to stories such as the alleged links between the murdered 
Mongolian model, Altantunya Shaariibuu, and then Deputy Prime Minister 
Najib Razak, as well as the judicial scandal involving V.K. Lingam.
The Internet movement is now a player in Malaysian politics, and those 
who refuse to believe this may have to rethink their views. Many may believe 
that the influence of the Internet does not reach beyond the urban masses, but 
this is rather simplistic. The Internet played a relatively small role in the 2004 
elections, but Internet penetration has surged since then with the continued 
roll-out of high-speed broadband facilities. According to international statistics 
gathered by the New Straits Times, Malaysia now has an Internet penetration 
rate of 60 percent. There were 3.7 million Internet users in a population of 
about 24.8 million in 2000. In 2007, this figure was nearly 14 million. This 
means that in eight years, Malaysia had a user growth rate of 302.8 percent. 
These are figures about Internet usage but not computer ownership or Internet 
subscriptions, which are related but different phenomena.65
The lesson that can be learned is that the Malaysian citizenry is far more 
sophisticated than the government had anticipated. The effects of development, 
globalization, and information dissemination through the Internet have changed 
the political landscape. Malaysians clearly reject the idea that the masses are 
generally simple-minded and easily influenced by “mob mentality” or fear, 
particularly of racial tension, of which the government warns if it were to 
lose an election. Since the 2008 general election, many leaders and former 
leaders of the government have joined the blogosphere by creating their own 
blogs such as those of former premier, Mahathir, http://www.chedet.co.cc, and 
63 New Sunday Times, “Surf’s Up with NET Power,” March 16, 2008, 30.
64 Yong, “Battle Lost in Cyberspace.”
65 Koh,“Was This the Election Made on the Internet?” and Lee, “Cyberspace Is Now the New 
Frontline.”
116  |  Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 5, No. 2
current Prime Minister Najib, http://www.1malaysia.com.my. The Internet 
and its community have strengthened the process of public deliberation and 
democratization in Malaysia. The government no longer can disregard the 
views expressed by the Internet community because they also are those of the 
middle class and the youth of Malaysia who access and use the technology 
extensively. This phenomenon obviously weakens the processes of the old 
politics of consociational democracy and encourages the new politics of 
deliberative democracy.
Malaysia’s New Leadership under Najib Razak
Since he took office as the nation’s sixth prime minister on April 3, 2009, 
several decisions of Najib Razak give a clear indication that he accepts the 
practice of deliberative democracy in Malaysia. He has urged the people to join 
him in his quest to revitalize the country through the concept of “1Malaysia.” 
His slogan is “People First, Performance Now.” “1Malaysia,” the thrust of 
Najib’s new administration, is centered on mutual respect and trust among 
the country’s various races, and is intended to be the guiding philosophy in 
programs and policies as well as in Najib’s vision for the economy, politics, 
and direction of the government. This new concept resembles those introduced 
by Najib’s predecessors such as Mahathir’s Bersih, Cekap, Amanah (Clean, 
Efficient, Trustworthy) and Abdullah’s “Work With Me, Not For Me”66 
programs. Acknowledging the importance for any government to have the 
trust and confidence of the people, Najib has urged the government to be 
truthful to the people,67 and introduced the eight values of “1Malaysia”: a 
culture of excellence, perseverance, humility, acceptance, loyalty, meritocracy, 
education, and integrity.68 Along with the spirit of “1Malaysia,” Najib also 
introduced Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for his ministers. Minister Koh 
Tsu Koon in the Prime Minister’s Department said that the KPI were aimed 
at monitoring the performance of ministers and deputy ministers and making 
improvements, but not at hauling them up for disciplinary action. The KPI 
framework and guidelines were drafted based on those used to evaluate the 
ministry secretaries-general and department directors-general. Public feedback 
and views on the quality of the civil service, including media reports, will 
be among factors used in evaluating KPIs for ministers and deputy ministers. 
Direct feedback received by ministries also will be taken into account and 
66 “Thumbs up for 1Malaysia,” The Star Online, April 5, 2009, 1, http://thestar.com.my/news/
story.asp?sec=focus&file=/2009/4/5/focus/3626318 (accessed April 7, 2009).
67 “Be Truthful to the People, PM Tells Leaders,” Bernama, May, 7, 2009, 1, http://www.bernama.
com.my/bernama/v5/newsindex.php?id=409363 (accessed May 7, 2009).
68 Ibid.
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dialogue sessions will be continued.69
Furthermore, the new Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin reiterated 
the government’s policy of “1Malaysia,” saying that the era of “government 
knows best” had ended and that it was time to engage the people in making 
decisions. He noted that the residents of a small town, Pagoh, in his constituency, 
were able to contribute ideas on the town’s development when the “Pagoh Idea 
Bank” was established. He stated his intention to set up suggestion boxes for 
residents to convey their ideas, and to chair the Pagoh Consultative Council 
which would review the suggestions.70 The statements of both the Prime 
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister show the tendencies of the government 
to implement deliberative democracy in which members of civil society are 
encouraged to participate in decision-making processes. In fact, the suggestion 
made by Muhyiddin is in line with the concept of the “town hall meeting,” 
which is essential in any deliberative democracy. Indeed, several similar types 
of deliberative democracy have been practiced already in Malaysia (see next 
section).
However, there are criticisms made especially by the opposition that Najib’s 
new concept is too rhetorical and has no real policy agenda, except to gain 
support and create a new government image, but with the same old repressive 
politics still in place. For instance, Anwar Ibrahim has ripped into the Najib 
administration’s “1Malaysia” program, calling it cosmetic and nothing more 
than a bald-faced political move to try to win back support from non-Malays. 
Other opposition politicians such as Lim Kit Siang71 and Tunku Abdul Aziz72 
and online news portals such as The Malaysian Insider73 have questioned the 
meaning and content of “1 Malaysia,” but Anwar gutted the whole concept, 
pointing out that Najib’s comments about unity and togetherness are only for 
public consumption. He argued that behind the scenes, the Biro Tatanegara 
(BTN), an agency under the Prime Minister’s Department, continues its 
indoctrination programs for Malay civil servants and politicians, telling 
Malays to be wary of Chinese and Indians. Anwar’s attack on the “1Malaysia” 
concept also reveals a growing uneasiness among the opposition about BN’s 
69 “Public Feedback Will Determine Ministers' KPI,” Bernama, April, 30, 2009, 1, http://www.
bernama.com/bernama//v3/news_lite.php?id=408105 (accessed May 5, 2009).
70 Anis Ibrahim and Rizalman Hammim, “Don’t Raise Chicken Prices, Says Muhyiddin,” New 
Sunday Times, May 3, 2009, 4.
71 Syed Jaymal Zahiid, “Najib’s 1Malaysia in Smithereens, Charges Kit Siang,” The Malaysian 
Insider, May 7, 2009, http://www.themalaysiainsider.com/lite/articles.php?id=25737 (accessed 
May 7, 2009).
72 Tunku Abdul Aziz, “1Malaysia: A Blurred Vision,” Transparency for a Democratic Malaysia, 
May, 2, 2009, http://tunku-aziz.org/2009/05/02/1-malaysia-a-blurred-vision/ (accessed May 24, 
2009).
73 “Once Again, What Is 1Malaysia?” The Malaysian Insider, April 16, 2009, http://www.
themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/opinion/breaking-views/23484-once-again-what-is-
1malaysia-the-malaysian-insider (accessed April 16, 2009).
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charm offensive to regain the support of non-Malay voters, the segment of 
voters who since the 2008 general election have become a reliable voter bloc 
for the PR. The new administration also has liberalized the financial services 
sector and attempted to solve the thorny issues of conversion of children to 
Islam when marriages breakdown. Nothing has been said about dismantling 
the NEP or spelling out how equality can be achieved among Malaysians, with 
the main architecture of affirmative action still in place and the Malay-centric 
civil service calling the shots at the implementation stage. In his blog posting, 
http://www.anwaribrahimblog.com, Anwar noted that UMNO called PR the 
tool of the Chinese and also hammered the DAP as a chauvinist party for its 
Malaysian Malaysia concept.74
According to Lim Kit Siang, the police lockdown and mass arrest of 
lawmakers and activists amid a chaotic Perak state assembly session on May 7, 
2008, shredded Najib’s “1 Malaysia” concept.75 Lim said that the arrests made 
it impossible for Najib to calm rising public anger over his perceived role as 
the orchestrator behind the BN’s harsh takeover of Perak on February 5, 2009, 
saying: “It is unlikely that Najib will be able to live down the political baggage 
of having orchestrated the three-month Perak constitutional and political crisis 
and stalemate spawning two Menteris Besar (Chief Ministers), two Speakers, 
two assemblies together with three renegade state assembly members and a 
renegade state assembly clerk unless he is prepared to act boldly to admit his 
colossal error and misjudgment and agree to dissolve the Perak State Assembly 
to hold a Perak state-wide election to return the mandate to Perakians.”76
The Perak crisis started when three PR members of the state assembly 
defected as independents friendly to BN. Najib, then Deputy Prime Minister, 
announced on February 4 that BN Perak had the numbers to form the 
government in Perak due to the defection. Later, the Sultan of Perak issued a 
statement on behalf of Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin, Perak Menteri Besar, 
that all Executive Councilors must resign with immediate effect. However, 
Nizar refused to resign, which caused a series of legal battles between BN and 
PR, both sides claiming to be the legitimate government, thus weakening the 
political system and democracy of Malaysia and that of Perak, in particular. 
On March 14, 2009, even Malaysia’s former premier, Mahathir Mohamad, 
said that the takeover was not in accordance law, and that the mistakes, bad 
strategy, and carelessness in the February 5, 2009 power grab, orchestrated 
74 “Anwar Trains His Sights on 1Malaysia,” The Malaysian Insider, April 30, 2009, 1, http://www.
themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/malaysia/25013-anwar-trains-his-sights-on-1malaysia 
(accessed April 30, 2009).
75 According to former Menteri Besar of Perak, Nizar Jamaluddin, the total number of people 
arrested was 157. See Shannon Teoh, “Clampdown Worse than Ops Lalang, says Nizar,” 
The Malaysian Insider, May 27, 2009, 1, http://www.malaysianinsider.com/index.php/
malaysia/27770-clampdown-worse-than-ops-lalang-says-nizar (accessed May 28, 2009).
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by Najib Razak, had led to the crisis in the state.77 Six people were charged 
with insulting the Perak ruler after he backed BN’s effort to govern the state. 
One pleaded guilty and was fined RM10,000, while the other five claimed 
innocence and asked for trial. UMNO asserted that those who opposed the 
Sultan’s decision had committed treason.78
Shad Saleem Fariqi maintains that the Perak political crisis has tarnished 
all institutions-the Sultanate, the judiciary, the federal executive, the civil 
service, the police, the law officers of the Crown, the court registry, the Anti-
Corruption Commission, and the Election Commission.79 The opposition 
claims that all of these institutions were misused and manipulated, and that 
the federal constitution was disregarded to ensure that the BN would stay in 
power in Perak. The Court of Appeal’s ruling to overturn the judgment of the 
High Court on the legitimate Menteri Besar of Perak deepened the crisis.80 
Therefore, many leaders from the PR and BN, such as MCA Deputy President 
Chua Soi Lek, the Malaysian Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM), 
and NGOs such as the Malaysian Bar Council and Aliran, demanded that the 
state assembly be dissolved as the best way to resolve the crisis and return 
democracy to the people. Owed to the Perak crisis, it appeared that the agenda 
of “1Malaysia” was more or less to force the people to unite under BN’s 
autocratic rule. Although Malaysia is heading toward deliberative democracy, 
BN is seen, especially by the opposition, to employ any method its leaders 
please to ensure its continuation in power.
Current Practices of Deliberative Democracy
Since the twelfth general election, the BN government has tried various methods 
to again dominate public opinion and regain voter support. Neither the BN 
government nor even the PR opposition has openly mentioned implementing 
practices of deliberative democracy such as town hall meetings, deliberative 
polling, or citizen juries, but both coalition parties realize that there is a need 
to encourage further citizen participation in the decision-making process. 
Although there are no deliberative practices being clearly employed, several 
efforts made by political leaders, the media, and netizens (Internet citizens) 
almost can be considered practices of deliberative democracy.
77 Shannon Teoh, “Dr M Says Perak Grab Unlawful,” The Malaysian Insider, March 14, 2009, 
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79 Shad Saleem Fariqi, “Put Interest of the Nation First,” Star Online, May 20, 2009, 1, 
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The Malaysian government normally pursues state development through 
“top-down” policies.81 Popular views often are excluded in the policy-making 
process, especially when the government has a great interest in a project. 
Mahathir, for instance, formerly was a builder, but some of his construction 
projects were designed not to be serviceable or to meet economic needs, but to 
impress, or even to embody an aesthetic aspiration. Robert Stephen Milne and 
Diane K. Mauzy observed that some of the mega projects, such as the Kuala 
Lumpur City Center (KLCC), Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), 
and the Putrajaya and Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), were intended to 
astonish rather than to be practical or utilitarian-amazement was meant to be 
the essence of their beauty.82 However, Mahathir argued that these projects 
were needed for Malaysia’s progress and to move it toward being a fully 
developed state by 2020.
Today, we can see that there is government interest to employ “bottom-up” 
or “people friendly” policies and to introduce deliberative democracy, even 
though officials still are unsure which approach to deliberative democracy is 
suitable. According to Saifuddin Abdullah,83 Deputy Minister in the Ministry 
of Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development and member of the national 
parliament from Temerloh, the business sector and civil society are involved in 
the decision-making process at a very limited level. At the national level, one 
of the few models of this is the National Youth Consultative Council (NYCC), 
established by the Ministry of Youth and Sports in 1972. The NYCC has been 
expanded to state and district levels. At levels beyond ministries, examples of 
citizen involvement are found in the National Economic Consultative Council 
(NECC) and the National Information and Technology Council (NITC).
The framework for deliberative democracy, or what Saifuddin has called 
“new governance,” is vital because, in this more complex, modern era in which 
society is more educated and broadly informed, public happiness can no longer 
be defined as simply receiving the benefits and advantages of development. On 
the contrary, happiness is also linked to public participation and deliberation 
in the process of how development is planned, executed, and evaluated.84 As 
Temerloh’s MP, Saifuddin established a body for deliberative democracy at the 
district level known as the Temerloh Parliament Consultative Council (TPCC). 
The TPCC is a collective and consensual forum, or grass-roots parliament, 
meant to acknowledge and increase stakeholders’ involvement in the decision-
81 Ishak Shari, “Pembangunan Desa dan Kemiskinan di Malaysia dalam tempoh Dasar Ekonomi 
Baru, 1972-1990” [Rural development and poverty in Malaysia during the period of New 
Economic Policy, 1972-1990], in Malaysia: Critical Perspectives, ed. Muhammad Ikmal Said 
and Zahid Embi (Petaling Jaya: Malaysian Social Science Association, 1996), 228.
82 Richard Stephen Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 67-68.
83 Saifuddin Abdullah, New Politics: Towards a Mature Malaysian Democracy (Kuala Lumpur: 
Institut Terjemahan Negara Malaysia, 2008), xxviii.
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making process for the development of this parliamentary constituency, 
specifically, and for the state of Pahang and Malaysia, generally. The objectives 
are to listen to and channel the grievances of the people, as well as to obtain and 
consider their ideas and opinions concerning development. Saifuddin chaired 
the forum in which fifty representatives participated from the three different 
sectors: government/politics, business, and civil society.85 The TPCC’s first 
proceedings were held on June 14, 2008, and received overwhelmingly 
positive responses. Many issues and ideas were raised and several programs 
were identified for implementation. The TPCC also serves to monitor and 
evaluate the six areas of local development promised in Saifuddin’s manifesto 
during the 2008 general election campaign, namely education and training, 
healthcare and fitness, employment and the economy, national identity and 
socio-culture, participation and civil society, and basic/public infrastructure.86 
The effort made by Saifuddin closely resembles a town hall meeting. Although 
this is a big step toward implementing deliberative democracy in Malaysia, 
so far it has received little acceptance or been copied by other MPs or other 
political leaders. A similar program, the Pagoh Consultative Council, has yet 
to function as a body of deliberative democracy.
The most common way for Malaysians to communicate and deliberate 
on national and international issues is through the Internet. The blog, news 
portals, and Facebook have become channels for public deliberation and can 
be directly accessed by political leaders from both the government and the 
political opposition. In fact, most influential political leaders have their own 
blogs and Facebook accounts. The Internet can definitely provide a forum for 
deliberation in the larger flow of communications in the public sphere. Carolyn 
Hendriks87 divides deliberative democracy into two types: “micro deliberative 
democracy,”88 which concentrates on defining the procedural conditions of a 
structured deliberative forum, and “macro deliberative democracy,”89 which is 
more concerned with the messy, unstructured deliberation which takes place 
in the public sphere. In Malaysia, the Internet is in the second category, in 
which the netizens are the political activists, media, political commentators, 
85 Ibid., xxix.
86 Ibid., xxx.
87 Carolyn Hendriks, “The Ambiguous Role of Civil Society in Deliberative Democracy,” paper 
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National University, Canberra, October, 2002.
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Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, 1997, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Phillip Pettit 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 128-42, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and 
Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996).
89 See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
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academics, members of social movements, advocacy groups, and ordinary 
citizens. Communication through the Internet is not always or even mainly 
deliberative. It can feature propaganda, deceit, and manipulation. John S. 
Dryzek argues that communication in the public sphere can be evaluated 
according to the degree to which it meets deliberative ideals or to the degree 
to which it violates these standards.90 Many political blogs, especially owned 
by political leaders such the Raja Petra (Malaysia Today), Mahathir Mohamad, 
Anwar Ibrahim, Lim Kit Siang, and Najib Razak, and Facebooks such as those 
of former minister and now PKR leader Zaid Ibrahim (http://www.facebook.
com/myzaidibrahim), PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang (http://www.facebook. 
com/abdulhadi?ref=mf), Najib Razak (http://www.facebook.com/Dato-Sri-
Najib-Tun-Abdul-Razak/27767103249?ref=ts), Anwar Ibrahim (http://www.
facebook.com/Anwar-Ibrahim/16194831839?ref=mf), and Lim Kit Siang 
(http://www.facebook.com/limkitsiang2.0?ref=ts) advertise and broadcast 
only their activities and statements concerning current issues.
Furthermore, netizens merely comment on policy issues, but hardly any 
deliberation is found between political leaders and the netizens concerning the 
formulation of public policy. M. Bakri Musa91 analyzes many of these Web 
sites or blogs. He observes that Najib’s Web site is professionally designed 
and maintained. It makes full use of the new media, including Youtube, 
Facebook, and Twitter, but unfortunately its contents do not reflect the man. 
Musa complains,
When I surf the websites of Mahathir, Lim Kit Siang or Anwar 
Ibrahim, I know that what is written reflects the person, right 
down to the tone and style of writing. I do not get that sense 
with 1Malaysia.com. It is written as if from a third person 
perspective instead of being personal, the very reason for 
having a blog. Of course I do not expect Najib Razak to write 
his own speeches; he has other important things to do like 
running the country. I do expect him however, to be on top 
of his speechwriters, and to do the final reading and make 
the necessary editorial changes so those speeches would truly 
represent and sound as if they emanated from him. He has to 
leave his imprint.92
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Not only is the style and tone of 1Malaysia.com divorced from Najib, but 
so too is the content. When someone asked him what the “1Malaysia” concept 
meant, Najib was unable to articulate it coherently. He was unable to relate his 
“1Malaysia” concept to his party’s pursuit for a unity government. Far from 
being his guiding vision, Najib’s “1Malaysia” is nothing more than the slick 
concoction of his highly-paid public relations personnel.93 This Web site also 
lists Najib’s policies, statements, and agenda, inviting only positive comments 
from visitors without any initiative to have deliberation on policy agenda.
Many political blogs also seem to have a self-reinforcing function where 
like-minded users simply help each other solidify their fixed preferences by 
cutting themselves off from any meaningful critique of their own beliefs 
and values. Described by Cass Sunstein as a kind of “echo-chamber,” many 
bloggers in Malaysia maintain that they do not want to engage in critical 
kinds of exchanges on-line, but instead use blogs to seek and interact with 
like-minded individuals.94 Moreover, the same technology that allows users 
to access an infinite number of debates and news sources also allows them 
to ignore and filter out those that may be critical of their own viewpoints.95 
The upshot is that the fragmentation and polarization of online communities 
undermines the deliberative credentials of blogs, as they may be more about 
monologue than discussion.96 Besides realizing the need for blogs to be used 
in practicing public deliberation, freedom of cyberspace is the most crucial 
issue in the current stage of Malaysian politics. This freedom must be ensured 
so that the people have alternative media to express their views, especially in 
policy matters, because the print and broadcasting media are controlled and 
dominated by the ruling government. Whether the views are accepted is up to 
the political leaders and policy makers to decide.
The other practice of deliberative democracy in Malaysia is probably a 
type of Citizen Forum called “Perspektif Kita” (Our Perspective), televised by 
cable channel Astro Awani every Saturday at 9:00 P. M. This program normally 
invites citizens, around fifty persons, to participate in discussion of national 
issues concerning the economy, politics, health, education, and crime, and so 
on, with political leaders, public officers, activists in civil society, academics, 
and others who are experts. Overseen by one coordinator, this program focuses 
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on deliberation only, without offering concrete resolutions or recommendations 
for policy formulation or implementation.
The problem with deliberative democracy in Malaysia is that there is no 
official or government instruction for practicing it. In fact, Prime Minister 
Najib still imposes several restrictions on the people’s right to free expression. 
For example, the Merdeka Review reported on May 15, 2009, that seven 
“sensitive” matters had been banned from discussion on RTM radio programs 
to prevent “controversy.” The banned topics were opposition party politics, sex, 
race, language, religion, the monarchy, and morals related to current political 
developments.97 These restrictions definitely will hinder the standard practice 
of deliberative democracy in Malaysia. In comparing Malaysia’s deliberative 
democracy to authoritarian deliberation in China, there are differences 
and similarities. Unlike Malaysia, a semi-democratic state with economic 
capitalism and an Islamic cultural tradition, China is an authoritarian system 
at the “macro” level, with democratizing practices at the “micro” village and 
township levels; market-driven individualism at the economic level; and a mix 
of Marxist, Confucian, and liberal cultural traditions.98 Although deliberative 
democracy in Malaysia is still in its infancy, the BN government’s reason to 
introduce deliberative democracy is rather similar to China, which, in the view 
of the author, is to enhance authoritarian control and improve the authoritarian 
capacities of governance.99
Conclusion
In sum, Malaysia is now entering a new phase of its democracy which is a 
move from consociational to public deliberation. The weakened BN facing the 
prospect of a stronger PR contributes to this process. Consensus politics in the 
BN tradition is being eroded. The two main contributors to the transition are the 
strengthening civil society and the new media of the Internet. The government 
cannot simply disregard these two factors that have transformed Malaysian 
society. The ruling BN now realizes that it is facing a strong opposition 
and civil society. The opposition, civil society, and people, in general, have 
become “watchdogs” to whatever policy and political decisions are made by 
the government. Thus, the government has to be responsive to the public good 
and its interests in order to be accepted by the people and prolong it control of 
power.
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The success of the “1Malaysia” concept remains to be seen, but it could 
be the best hope to ensure the BN’s victory in the thirteenth general election, 
probably scheduled for 2013. Whatever happens in the future, Malaysia 
already has entered the new politics of deliberative democracy. Therefore, the 
BN government and the PR state governments must listen to public voices 
and serve the people’s interests. They all must change or be changed in the 
next election if they violate the people’s trust. The anxiety is that the BN 
government’s only purpose in accepting deliberative democracy is to maintain 
its authoritarian agenda. However, it is clear that people now know about the 
power that they have through new technology to change the government. They 
want reforms, so the government must fulfill their demands and deliver reforms 
to them. Deliberative democracy will bring maturity to Malaysia through new 
politics.
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